No EntryPoverty ReductionNov 2021
Lousy households normally count on transfers from their social networks for usage smoothing, but there is constrained proof on how antipoverty applications impact informal transfers. This paper exploits the randomized rollout of BRAC’s extremely-very poor graduation application in Bangladesh and panel details covering in excess of 21,000 households in excess of 7 several years to review the program’s outcomes on interhousehold transfers. The application crowds out informal transfers gained by the specific households, but this is driven generally by outdoors-village transfers. Treated extremely-very poor households become a lot more possible to both equally give and obtain transfers to/from wealthier households within their village and significantly less possible to obtain transfers from their employers. As a consequence, the reciprocity of their within-village transfers increases. The results indicate that, within rural communities, there is good assortative matching by socio-economic status. A reduction in poverty permits households to engage a lot more in reciprocal transfer arrangements and lowers the interlinkage of their labor with informal insurance policies.
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